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Abstract—NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems 
Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) project 
conducted an empirical investigation of the impact of 
time delay on today’s mission operations, and of the 
effect of processes and mission support tools designed to 
mitigate time-delay related impacts. Mission operation 
scenarios were designed for NASA’s Deep Space Habitat 
(DSH), an analog spacecraft habitat, covering a range of 
activities including nominal objectives, DSH system 
failures, and crew medical emergencies. The scenarios 
were simulated at time delay values representative of 
Lunar (1.2-5 sec), Near Earth Object (NEO) (50 sec) and 
Mars (300 sec) missions. Each combination of 
operational scenario and time delay was tested in a 
Baseline configuration, designed to reflect present-day 
operations of the International Space Station, and a 
Mitigation configuration in which a variety of software 
tools, information displays, and crew-ground 
communications protocols were employed to assist both 
crews and Flight Control Team (FCT) members with the 
long-delay conditions. Preliminary findings indicate: 1) 
Workload of both crewmembers and FCT members 
generally increased along with increasing time delay. 2) 
Advanced procedure execution viewers, caution and 
warning tools, and communications protocols such as 
text messaging decreased the workload of both flight 
controllers and crew, and decreased the difficulty of 
coordinating activities. 3) Whereas crew workload 
ratings increased between 50 sec and 300 sec of time 
delay in the Baseline configuration, workload ratings 
decreased (or remained flat) in the Mitigation 
configuration.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For the last 50 years, NASA’s crewed missions have been 
confined to the Earth-Moon system, where speed-of-light 
communications delays between crew and ground are 
practically nonexistent.  The close proximity of the crew to 
the Earth has enabled NASA to operate human space 
missions primarily from the ground. This “ground-centered” 
mode of operations has had several advantages: by having a 
large team of the people involved on the ground, the on-
board crew could be smaller, the vehicles could be simpler 
and lighter, and the mission performed for a lower cost.  
 
Table 1.  Human spaceflight destinations in the Solar 
System, approximate distance from Earth, and 
approximate one-way light time delay. 
 
NASA is now investigating a range of future human 
spaceflight missions that includes a variety of Martian 
destinations and a range of Near Earth Object (NEO) 
targets.  These possibilities are summarized in Table 1.  The 
table shows the approximate distance between the 
Destination Earth Distance 
(km) 
1-way Time 
delay (s) 
Lunar 38,400,000 1.3 
NEOs (close) variable variable 
Mars (close) 545,000,000 181.6 
Mars 
(opposition) 
4,013,000,000 1337.6 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170011337 2019-08-31T01:26:04+00:00Z
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destination and the Earth, where the control center will be 
located, and the one-way light-time delay between the 
destination and Earth. 
 
As is evident from Table 1, future missions will be of much 
longer duration, and put crews much further from Earth, 
than today’s missions. Accordingly, NASA has recently 
funded a number of projects to develop and test operations 
concepts for these future missions. Table 2 summarizes 
these projects, some of which have included studies of the 
impact of time delay. We will briefly describe the previous 
projects here, and refer the reader to the cited studies in the 
table for more details.   
 
The NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations 
(NEEMO) missions [3,8] are conducted at the Aquarius 
undersea habitat with mixes of astronaut and scientist crews.  
Extra-vehicular activities (EVA) involve divers, 
submersibles, and spacecraft analogs; EVA objectives 
included construction and science tasks.  The Desert 
Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) conduct field 
tests involving analog spacecraft and habitats; EVA 
activities focus on science tasks such as gathering and 
analyzing geological samples [1].  The Houghton Mars 
Project facility in Nunnavit Territory, Canada focuses on 
activities ranging from science EVAs to robotic 
experimentation including drills and mobile robots [8].  
Finally, the Mars 500 105 day experiment [8,9] was 
primarily a living and working experiment with a brief 
simulated EVA.  All experiments included some quiescent 
activities, but none involved systems failure simulations. 
 
Table 2.  Previously conducted investigations of the 
impact of time delay on spaceflight, compared to the 
AMO study. 
 
While not an operations study, a study of remote medical 
operations [7] initial assessed whether a communication 
delay can impact remotely guided collection of ultrasound 
images. Choosing a communication delay experienced 
during lunar missions, the investigators demonstrated that 
increasing the communication delay up to 5 seconds did not 
impact a remote guidance expert’s ability to guide non-
ultrasound experts to collect high quality ultrasound images.  
 
On next-generation deep-space missions, crews will have to 
operate much more autonomously than they do today.  A 
higher degree of crew autonomy represents a fundamental 
change to mission operations. Enabling this new operations 
philosophy requires a host of protocol and technology 
development. To address these issues, NASA’s 
Autonomous Missions Operations (AMO) project charter is 
to provide operational guidelines and requirements for next-
generation crewed missions that will experience significant 
time delay between mission control and the flight crew.  
Specifically, AMO addresses the following question:  How 
should mission operations responsibilities be allocated 
between ground and the spacecraft in the presence of 
significant light-time delay between the spacecraft and the 
Earth? 
 
To begin addressing this question, an experiment assessing 
crew-ground interaction and operational performance was 
performed in May and June of 2012 in NASA Johnson 
Space Center’s Deep-Space Habitat (DSH) [10,18], an 
Earth-analog of a workspace and living area that might 
house a crew during the transport and surface phases of a 
deep-space crewed mission. Crews consisting of a 
commander and three flight engineers followed a two-hour 
mission timeline populated with activities representative of 
those that might occur during a typical day in the quiescent 
(cruise) phase of a long-duration space mission.  Crews 
were supported by a small flight control team (FCT) 
consisting of eight console positions located in the 
Operations Technology Facility (OTF) in the Christopher 
Kraft Mission Control Center at Johnson Space Center.  The 
two-hour mission timeline was performed repeatedly under 
varying conditions: 
 
• A simulated time delay between the ground and the 
vehicle of low (1.2 or 5 seconds), medium (50 
seconds), or long (300 seconds) duration. 
• Either no unexpected events (nominal), multiple 
spacecraft systems failures (off-nominal systems), 
or a crew medical emergency (off-nominal 
medical). 
• One of two mission operations configurations.  In 
the Baseline configuration, conducted first, the 
flight control team and crew performed their 
nominal and off-nominal tasks with support tools, 
interfaces, and communications protocols similar 
to those in use for International Space Station 
operations today. In the Mitigation configuration, 
crews and FCT members had access to an 
advanced suite of operations support tools and 
mission support technologies that we hypothesized 
would enable the crew to carry out nominal and 
off-nominal mission operations with greater 
autonomy and with enhanced crew-ground 
coordination capability under time delay. 
Analog  Year Time delays Range of activity ; 
variations 
Haughton Mars 
Project 
2008 N/A  EVA, quiescent; 
nominal 
Mars 500 105 
day study 
2009 0; 
20 minute 
EVA, quiescent; 
nominal 
NEEMO 13 2009 0; 
20 minute 
EVA, quiescent; 
nominal 
NEEMO 14 2010 0; 
Twice daily  
EVA, quiescent; 
nominal 
Desert RATS  2010 0; 
Twice daily  
EVA, quiescent; 
nominal 
NEEMO 15 2011 0; 
50 second 
EVA 
    
AMO 2012 1.5 sec, 5 sec, 50 
sec, 5 minute 
Quiescent; nominal, 
systems failure, 
medical emergency 
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The AMO study complements and extends previous studies 
of time delay in ground-based analog environments in a 
variety of ways. The AMO study is the first of the studies in 
NASA’s Earth-analog environments to examine the effects 
of time delay in an operational environment that:  
 
• Exclusively utilized highly experienced NASA 
flight controllers and astronauts as study 
participants. 
• Achieved at least a medium level of mission 
operational fidelity (as rated by the participants). 
• Exclusively employed operations products (plans 
and procedures) like those used in crewed missions 
today.   
 
In addition, the study was conducted on much shorter 
timescales (hours) than previous studies (days or weeks), 
allowed the experiment to incorporate a considerably wider 
variety of conditions than previous ground-analog studies, 
and more systematically manipulated the factors of time 
delay, level of autonomy, and type of scenario. Since the 
experiment was staffed directly by NASA International 
Space Station and Space Shuttle flight controllers and 
astronauts, we made sure to solicit extensive written 
feedback from participants, both at the end of each run and 
following all runs, yielding a rich database of observations 
and expert opinions on the effects of time delay and the 
impact and usefulness of our mitigation tools. In addition to 
this written feedback, we collected data on several objective 
(e.g., task completion time and accuracy), and subjective 
(e.g., rated workload) measures of performance, along with 
written explanations of virtually all subjective ratings (e.g., 
if you rated your workload as “5” on the run just completed, 
why did you select that rating?). Consequently, we were 
able to take an integrative approach to data analysis and 
interpretation; for example, by using participants’ written 
comments to inform our interpretation of empirical patterns 
in the objective and subjective measures of performance.  
 
The roles and responsibilities of the crews in our study 
differed fundamentally from those of the FCT. 
Crewmembers were the primary “doers”, responsible for 
performing most of the procedures associated with their 
assigned activities, and completing troubleshooting 
procedures in response to system failures and medical 
emergencies. While FCT members did play an active role in 
some of these procedures as well, overall their role was 
more supportive, advising and guiding crewmembers as 
they went about their activities. This is due to the fact that 
all activities in the experiment timeline were ‘hands-on’, 
and could not be completed solely with ground 
commanding.  From an information processing perspective, 
the different responsibilities of crew and FCT suggested that 
ground personnel might put a high priority on seeking out 
and processing information sources pertaining to crew 
activities and progress, in that way maintaining as high a 
level of situation awareness as possible concerning what the 
crew was doing, and how well they were doing it. On the 
other hand, engaging in information acquisition activities to 
“stay on top of” the activities of FCT members was not as 
high a priority for the crew. A priori, therefore, crew and 
ground responses and assessments of the impact of time 
delay might be expected differ. However, until we ran our 
study, such differences belonged solely to the realm of 
conjecture. Our approach to both experiment design and 
data collection enabled us to systematically compare results 
and findings between crewmembers and FCT members to 
identify and quantify such differences, leading to a better 
understanding of the impact of time delay from the two 
perspectives.  
 
The second goal of our study was to evaluate the impact of 
several advanced technologies and decision-aiding tools that 
we provided in the Mitigation configuration. An important 
aspect of this evaluation involved comparing objective and 
subjective measures of performance between the Baseline 
and Mitigation configurations at the different time delays. 
Again, there were several a priori reasons to expect the tools 
would have a positive impact. In Baseline, the only channel 
for crew-ground communication was the voice loops. Voice 
communications, of course, must be attended to in real time, 
and if a communication act is partially unattended or 
misunderstood, the only way to achieve clarification is to 
request a repeat of the communication.  When a 
communication act is misunderstood under significant time 
delay, the round-trip time delay involved in receiving a 
repeat may well discourage the receiver from making the 
request at all, meaning that the original communication 
remains misunderstood. Some such problems could be 
eliminated in the Mitigation configuration, where additional 
channels of communication are available (shown in Figure 
7). When a communication arrives in written form, e.g. via a 
texting tool, the receiver can process it “after the fact” with 
no ambiguity regarding the content. Thus, we would expect 
the texting feature to be of significant benefit under time 
delay. 
 
Additional benefits would also be expected from two 
additional tools. In Baseline, crew procedures were only 
available in the form of static Portable Document Format 
(PDF) files, essentially just ported versions of paper files. 
Navigating through static depictions of procedures is a 
notoriously workload-intensive activity, partly because the 
crewmember must keep track of their progress through the 
procedure strictly from memory. Furthermore, FCT 
members have no means of tracking crew progress through 
their procedures except for voice updates. By contrast, in 
Mitigation, procedures were available in the form of a 
dynamic procedure display called WebPD (Figure 8). 
WebPD contained a focus bar that tracked where a 
crewmember was in a procedure and progressed through the 
procedure as the crewmember completed steps. In addition, 
windows were provided that showed which procedures were 
currently active, and which had been completed. Finally, 
WebPD was shared over the air-ground link, rendering it 
4 
 
 
viewable by all crewmembers and FCT members. This 
general availability allowed crewmembers to keep track of 
each others’ activities, and enabled the FCT to track the 
crew’s progress through a procedure without resorting to 
voice or text calls. Another tool, Advanced Caution and 
Warning (ACAWS), automated two important aspects of 
Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) activities, 
namely, the initial diagnosis of the source of a failure 
(depicted in an intuitive fashion on a graphical user 
interface), and an automatic recommendation of appropriate 
troubleshooting or recovery procedures. In Baseline, by 
contrast, both crew and ground had to diagnose the source 
of failures by integrating information from the legacy 
caution and warning system (i.e., through failure messages 
and alerts) and to make their own determination as to which 
procedure to follow. Without ACAWS, the crew is more 
dependent on ground expertise to make these decisions, 
rendering FDIR activities more impacted by time delay. 
 
In summary, the Mitigation configuration provided:    
• Tools allowing the crew to visualize spacecraft 
telemetry and issue commands from procedure 
displays. 
• Tools allowing flight controllers to track procedure 
execution status across time delay. 
• Advanced caution and warning tools to 
automatically isolate faults and recommend 
procedures based on vehicle configuration. 
• A texting client in addition to voice loops for crew 
ground communication. 
 
A priori, we hypothesized that: 
• Crews would complete less of the timeline as the 
time delay increased. 
• Crew workload would increase as the time delay 
increased. 
• Crew-ground coordination would become more 
difficult as the time delay increased. 
• Crews would complete more of the timeline in the 
mitigation configuration. 
• Crew workload would be lower in the mitigation 
configuration. 
• Crew-ground coordination would be easier in the 
mitigation configuration. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The test 
environment and activities in the crew timeline are 
described in Section 2.  The experiment design is described 
in Section 3.  The test measurements used to analyze 
participant workload, coordination, timeline completion, 
and communications are described in Section 4.  The 
analysis of task completion is described in Section 5.  A 
preliminary analysis of participant workload is described in 
Section 6.  The analysis of coordination difficulty is 
described in Section 7.  The analysis of communications is 
described in Section 8. Finally, in Section 9, we present our 
conclusions and discuss future work. 
 
 2. TEST ENVIRONMENT AND TIMELINE  
The Deep Space Habitat 
The Deep Space Habitat [10,18] was developed as a 
functional test article with the flexibility to be used in 
various configurations. The DSH is comprised of the 
Atrium/Hab, Hygiene Module, Lab, Deployable Porch 
Ramp, and Dust Mitigation Module (aka, Airlock). For the 
purposes of the AMO project, the Lab was the only section 
of the DSH actively used by the crew, with the Dust 
Mitigation Module being used for stowage. The Lab module 
of the DSH is divided into eight pie-piece segments, labeled 
A-H. The Lab is outfitted with a General Maintenance Work 
Station (GMWS), a Medical Operations Work Station 
(MOWS), and a Tele-Robotics Work Station (TRWS) that 
controlled a camera on the exterior of the Lab. The three 
workstations - GMWS, MOWS, and TRWS - each have 
their own segment so as not to interfere with operations 
occurring at the others.  DSH subsystems employed in the 
AMO experiment are described below. 
Figure 1.  The Deep Space Habitat internal volume 
layout and key workstations. 
DSH Power 
The primary power used by the DSH is 120 Vac supplied 
from a variety of sources. Secondary power sources of 120 
Vac, 28 Vdc, and 120 Vdc were also available for use.   The 
power system schematic is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Sensors 
Instrumentation system sensors provided data to each of the 
DSH modules and airlock subsystems to provide insight into 
system performance. These sensors were powered by the 
DSH power.  
 
External Camera 
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Figure 2.  DSH Electrical Power System schematic, also showing ACAWS User Interface. 
 
Figure 3.  DSH fluid transfer schematic, also showing fluid transfer User Interface. 
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The DSH is equipped with a Sony SNC RZ30N network 
equipped pan-tilt-zoom camera.  This camera is mounted 
between segments G and H on the outside of the DSH.  The 
camera was integrated with the DSH avionics in order to be 
commandable from inside the DSH.  The camera was also 
integrated with the DSH avionics so that all acquired camera 
images were placed on the file system of the TRWS, and 
downloadable from there to computers in the FCT. 
 
Fluid Transfer System 
For the AMO simulations, a water transfer activity was 
simulated on a laptop in the Lab to simulate the transfer of 
water between a virtual DSH primary water supply tank and 
the Atrium Water tank used to water the onboard plants.    
Anin valves (“A” valves below) had multiple possible 
positions.  “C” valves were computer controlled and could 
be commanded by the FCT or the crew through the laptop.  
“G” valves were Gate Valves that had to be commanded 
through a hardware switch simulated on the GeoLab 
workstation computer and could not be commanded from the 
ground.  The design of this system is intentionally more 
complex than required if it were a real system to make 
failure scenarios on par with DSH electrical failures for 
experimental design purposes.  The fluid transfer system is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4.  The 2 hour timeline of all tasks scheduled for 
execution by the crew for the AMO experiment.  The 
first four rows indicate activity performed by each crew 
person, the last bands show required coordination by the 
FCT for each activity. 
 
Timeline 
The experiment employed variations of a timeline of 
activities that the crew needed to complete. For the 
simulation “initial conditions”, the vehicle was returning 
form an asteroid and was in a “quiescent” operational mode, 
meaning there are no significant, complex or dynamic 
operations scheduled (i.e. no burns or other maneuvers were 
planned for the day).  The vehicle was in a nominal 
configuration except for some designated conditions listed 
below, and there were no previous major systems failures.  
 
The crew’s timeline consisted of 12 activities of varying 
duration during a two-hour period, and is shown in Figure 4. 
In the Baseline configuration, these activities were preceded 
by a 10 minute schedule-prepwork activity and a 15 minute 
Daily Planning Conference (DPC) activity, in which the 
flight control team briefed the crew on the specifics of the 
day’s timeline.  In the Mitigation configuration, these 
activities were merged into a single schedule-prepwork 
activity of 25 minutes. The most important information 
passed up during the DPC were parameters for the atrium 
tank fluid fill (system set up conditions, target fill level and 
estimated fill duration). 
 
Atrium Tank Fluid Fill: The atrium fill condition for the 
experiment was as follows: “The plants in the Atrium which 
require the most amount of water are starting to show health 
degradation and thus the crew has been asked not to take any 
fresh vegetables from the plants.  The working theory is that 
the Atrium plant irrigation cycles have been using higher 
amounts of water than expected which dropped the water 
level in the Atrium tank.  This caused the concentration of 
automatically added additives (fertilizer, macronutrients, etc) 
to be increased in the irrigation water which in turn has 
affected the plants.  The Atrium tank will be resupplied with 
fresh water today during the fluid fill activity to reduce 
additive concentration within the tank.  Once the tank is 
filled, the water should sit for 2 hours to allow the additives 
to fully mix with the new water.  After those 2 hours, the 
plants will be watered for 8 hours.  Plant watering must be 
complete prior to pre-sleep activities.”  These time 
constraints were selected so that there was some slack in the 
schedule (~ 1 hour) to water the plants before sleep but not 
much slack time, making this a high priority activity. 
 
Vehicle Survey: The vehicle survey condition for the 
experiment is as follows: “The crew reported late in their 
day yesterday hearing unusual noises on one side of the 
DSH.  No onboard sensors have indicated any off nominal 
vehicle system issues. An external vehicle survey has been 
scheduled today to view the external area of the DSH where 
the crew thinks a possible meteor strike may have occurred. 
This survey will be conducted by the crew, with ground 
assistance, using a robotic camera system mounted outside 
the spacecraft.”  This was the highest priority activity in the 
timeline, and per Flight Rules, the survey must be conducted 
as soon as possible within 24 hours of a suspected impact. 
CDR 
FE1 
FE2 
FE3 
 
 
FCT 
7 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Soil pH sample task. 
 
Soil pH determination: The activity description read: “Prior 
to the plants being watered, soil pH should be measured for 
the plants in question to get a baseline reading of the plant’s 
growing condition.  If any soil pH is found to be outside of 
the acceptable range, the test for that plant will be repeated 
again tomorrow and it should not be harvested for food to 
prevent further stress on the plant. The areas of high additive 
concentration will need some time to be broken down. It is 
expected that it may be a minimum of 48 hours before the 
full range of fresh fruits and vegetables will once again be 
available on the menu. Some sections may be available 
sooner, but that will depend on what the data analysis 
shows.”  This activity is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Interim Resistive Exercise Device (iRED) Inspection and 
Cleaning: The iRED activity description was as follows: “At 
the end of the last crew day, the crew reported some 
grinding coming from the IRED canister.  The crew will 
disassemble, inspect and clean the canister at the start of the 
sim timeline.  Inspection photos will be downlinked to the 
ground for analysis which takes 20 minutes.  The crew must 
wait for FCT “Go” before performing any exercise.  Due to 
previous failures, this is the only piece of resistive exercise 
equipment available onboard.”  It is unrealistic for any 
ground analysis to take only 20 minutes; the duration was 
shortened for the scenario to fit within the 2-hour simulation 
schedule.  The point is for the crew to send data down to the 
ground in time for ground to give the crew ‘go’ to exercise.  
This activity is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Return Sample Inventory: This activity required inventory 
and sorting of asteroid samples being returned to Earth.  The 
condition read: “There is a concern that the samples taken on 
the fifth day of operations at the asteroid were contaminated.  
Payloads has requested the crew examine those samples 
again and send some additional data for comparison against 
the initial assessment of those samples.” 
 
Space Station Computer (SSC) Hard Drive Troubleshooting: 
The activity description read: “The last time the crew 
attempted to use a specific SSC it could not access the hard 
drive.  The CDR has an activity today to attempt to 
troubleshoot.” 
Figure 6. iRED inspection and cleaning task. 
 
Missing Item Search: The activity description read: “A few 
days ago an Ovoid Canister required for an Environment 
Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) onboard activity 
could not be found in the location documented in the 
onboard inventory system.  The ground would like the crew 
to spend a few minutes looking for the lost item.   If the item 
is found the crew reports the location and FCT provides a 
new storage location.” 
 
Air Filter R&R: This activity required replacement of four 
DSH Air Filters.  Per Flight Rules the air filters should be 
replaced every 50 days, but are certified for 75 days of 
operation. 
 
Bicep and Calf measurement: Measuring the calf and bicep 
muscle for atrophy.  This activity was designed to be 
representative of a nominal medical procedure 
 
Education and Public Outreach (EPO) Blog: Crew members 
composed a blog entry about their day aboard the spacecraft 
and the impact of communication time delay. These blogs 
were provided to JSC Public Affairs Office (PAO) and 
posted on a public NASA Website. 
 
Sound Level Measurement: This activity required 
measurement of ambient sound levels within the DSH.  Per 
Flight Rules, sound level meter readings are required every 
150 days.  It has been 145 days since the last time this 
activity was complete and it is currently scheduled for today. 
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PAO Event: A time critical event, which served as a 
milestone to reach by the end of the two-hour simulation 
period. 
 
Three ‘get-ahead’ tasks were also provided in the event the 
crew had extra time or an activity needed to be abandoned 
and replaced; an equipment inventory task, Just-in-time 
training videos, and additional bicep and calf measurements.  
Activities required one or two crew; some required support 
by the flight control team. For example, the iRED, DSH 
Backside Inspection, Sound Level Meter, Plant Soil pH,  
Calf length measurement, and sample inventory activities all 
required data collected onboard the DSH be  transferred to 
the FCT.  The iRED, Plant Soil Ph, and Fluid transfer 
activities all required the FCT to coordinate with the DSH 
crew during at least part of the activity.   This coordination 
ensured that the crew and the FCT would communicate 
periodically, even in a nominal scenario. 
 
3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN  
Flight Control and Crew Roles 
Each AMO crew was comprised of four members, 
corresponding to the current NASA reference mission crew 
sizes.  Table 3 describes the four positions and the 
responsibilities allocated to them for the AMO experiment.  
A total of four distinct crews participated in the experiment 
to ensure that learning did not skew the quantitative results. 
For each crew, the Commander (CDR) was a previously-
flown astronaut; the remaining three crewmembers were 
experienced trainers and flight controllers from MOD 
(Mission Operations Directorate).   
 
Table 3. Crew Position Descriptions. 
 
The AMO Flight Control Team (FCT) consisted of eight 
console positions.  Table 4 shows the console positions and 
the technical topics assigned to the console.  The 
“CAPCOM” and “FLIGHT” console names are legacy titles.  
The rest of the consoles were named after well-known 
asteroids.  The CAPCOM console was staffed by non-
astronaut certified International Space Station (ISS) 
CAPCOMs with the exception of two runs that were staffed 
by an astronaut certified ISS and Shuttle CAPCOM, and one 
run that was staffed by a an experienced Shuttle flight 
controller.   
 
 
Table 4. Flight Control Team Positions. 
 
The Flight Director console was staffed for five runs in both 
the Baseline and Mitigation simulations by two certified 
Flight Directors, one certified for both Shuttle and ISS and 
one certified for ISS only.  The rest of the runs were staffed 
by experienced role-play Flight Directors who are senior 
flight controllers from ISS and Shuttle. 
 
The remaining six FCT console positions were staffed with 
experienced flight controllers from the ISS and/or Station 
programs.  The majority of the controllers had Flight Control 
Room (or “front room”) experience; a few had certifications 
at the “back room” or support / analyst level.  The PSYCHE 
console was staffed by certified ISS Biomedical Engineers 
(BMEs) and the KALI console was staffed by certified 
ISS/Shuttle Planners.  The other consoles were staffed with 
flight controllers from a variety of discipline backgrounds.  
Since the AMO activities and DSH systems were relatively 
simple, there was not a need to match a flight controller’s 
technical background with the corresponding AMO console 
position. The AMO experiment did not employ distinct 
flight control teams due to limitations on available 
personnel. 
 
Experiment Parameters 
The experiment varied three parameters: the inserted time 
delay, scenarios involving deviations from the original 
timeline, and the operations configuration. 
 
The AMO experiments originally used three different time 
delay values.  For technical reasons, results from the low 
time delay values were confounded with amount of operator 
training, so the later sections of the paper will focus the 
presentation on results for runs with one-way light-time 
delay values of 50 seconds and 300 seconds. 
 
Experiment runs conducted with no planned deviations from 
the original timeline are referred to as Nominal.  In addition, 
experiment runs conducted with inserted failures of both the 
fluid transfer and electrical systems are referred to as 
Systems.  Finally, runs conducted with a crew medical 
emergency are labeled Medical. 
Commander 
(CDR) 
Oversees mission operations, coordinates 
priorities with FCT. 
Flight Engineer 
(FE-1) 
Backup to commander; performs day to 
day vehicle maintenance and sample 
inventory 
Flight Engineer 
(FE-2) 
Performs day to day vehicle maintenance  
Flight Engineer 
(FE-3) 
Primary robotics operator and Chief 
Medical Officer 
Console Name Current Discipline Corollary 
CAPCOM Air to Ground (A/G) Communication 
with the crew 
CERES Payloads and science 
FLIGHT Coordination of flight control team, 
mission success 
IRIS Robotics 
JUNO Electrical and environmental systems 
KALI Planning and Public Affairs 
PSYCHE Biomedical Engineer (BME); Crew 
medical monitoring 
VESTA General maintenance and computers 
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Medical Scenarios 
Thirty-minutes into the start of a run with a scripted medical 
failure, a NASA Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) 
moderator supporting AMO identified a crewmember to act 
as the ill astronaut, and subsequently had that person act out 
the symptoms of the medical condition to the Crew Medical 
Officer (CMO).  During the initial sequence of the scenario, 
the moderator provided the ill crewmember with the 
information needed for any questions asked by the CMO 
(e.g. answers to examination questions and vital sign data).  
At a certain point, the moderator took over the role of the ill 
astronaut with that crewmember no longer participating in 
the scenario.  This was done to keep the scenario relatively 
consistent between crews and, thus, help with comparisons 
between sessions. 
 
During the Baseline configuration runs the medical scenario 
was ultimately diagnosed as urinary retention; for the 
mitigation runs, the problem was a kidney stone.  These two 
failures had similar initial symptoms and resulted in a 
similar ultrasound diagnosis process. 
 
Systems Scenarios 
For simulation cases with DSH system failures, two different 
equipment failures were injected at 30 minutes, and 
subsequently, 1 hour 15 minutes, into the simulation run.  
The first failure introduced was the A3 valve failing to a 
maximum open value (100% open).  The fluid transfer 
plumbing, tanks, and associated valves, pumps, pressures 
and tank quantities were entirely simulated in a MatLab 
model.  Interfaces within the model allowed simulation 
supervisors to inject failures to valves and pumps, overriding 
any crew or flight controller commanding, resulting in 
changes to the flow characteristics.  The fluid system failure 
was timed to occur shortly after fluid transfer was initiated, 
with the Atrium Tank level below 45% full.  By 30 minutes 
into the simulation, the crew had initiated the flow, and 
typically had moved on to other planned activities when the 
failure was injected.  
 
The second failure, injected at 1 hour 15 minutes into 
Systems runs, was the 28 Volt Power Converter failing off.  
In preparation to support such a failure, the 28V converter 
switch was relocated from Power Distribution Unit PDU_B1 
Bank 2 Port 2 to PDU_B1 Bank 2 Port 6.  This relocation 
allowed the simulation supervisor to turn off the power 
supply to the 28V converter with no indication from the 
switch position indicator on the DSH Crew Display. This 
allowed the 28V converter to be turned off by simulation 
supervisors, but inspection of the DSH Crew Display would 
still show the Port 2 switch as ON and downstream loads 
from the 28V converter as offline.  This was also effective in 
causing the software to recognize the condition as a fault and 
trigger the appropriate failure messages.  The timing of this 
failure was again consistent for all systems cases, and was 
timed to occur with sufficient time left in the simulation to 
complete FDIR procedures.  The timing also generally lined 
up with completion of the Fluid Transfer operation. 
 
Both systems failures were designed in such a way that the 
root cause of the failure was not completely obvious when 
the failure occurred, and required one or more diagnostic 
steps in order to positively identify the source of the problem 
and determine the appropriate isolation and recovery 
procedures.   
 
Baseline and Mitigation Operations configurations 
The Baseline operations configuration was designed to be 
similar to the manner in which the International Space 
Station is operated today.  The crew has the primary 
responsibility for conducting each activity, supported by the 
ability to monitor data from all spacecraft systems on a suite 
of crew displays.  However, the crew had limited in-depth 
knowledge of DSH systems and their operation.  By 
contrast, the FCT included specialists with in-depth 
knowledge of each DSH system and its operating 
characteristics; the crew could turn to this expertise to 
support them, particularly during the off-nominal Systems 
runs.  However, at the longer time delays, the FCT could 
only respond to crew questions after a significant time delay. 
Similarly, FCT could monitor spacecraft telemetry, but not 
in real time. Recall that all crew and flight control 
communications could take place only via voice loops. 
 
Each spacecraft subsystem in the DSH came with a legacy 
Caution and Warning system that provided only limited 
machine-based fault management assistance to crew and 
FCT alike. The system reported faults only if single test 
parameters (sensor outputs) were determined to be outside 
pre-specified tolerances (limits).  This allowed the crew or 
the flight control team to determine that a fault has occurred, 
but provided no more assistance with the additional steps 
that are typically required to diagnose, isolate, and recover 
from systems malfunctions. 
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Figure 7.  Texting client used by crew and flight 
controllers. 
 
Finally, the crew’s plans, system-specific procedures, and 
other spacecraft specific knowledge, exist in the form of 
office documents.  Thus, if the crew has questions about the 
significance of an activity that may need to be skipped, or if 
the flight control team wishes to know what step of a 
procedure the crew is on, this coordination must take place 
over voice loops. 
 
The Mitigation operations configuration differs from the 
Baseline configuration in several key respects.  First, a 
texting1 client provided an additional communication 
channel between the flight control team and the crew.  The 
flight controllers and crew had two air-ground chat rooms, 
and a third chat room was reserved for the flight control 
team.  The crew initiated all air-ground text messages, and 
texting was intended for only non-urgent or non-emergency 
messages.  The text interface is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Second, Advanced Caution and Warning (ACAWS) 
software technologies provided both automated detection 
and isolation of many faults, and automated 
recommendations of fault isolation or recovery procedures.  
The AMO experiment employed the Testability and 
Engineering Maintenance System (TEAMS) [14], a 
                                                           
1 The aviation community uses a texting tool called 
Datalink. 
Figure 8.  WebPD, the electronic procedure display and procedure execution tracking tool. 
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Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) tool, which was applied 
to detect faults in the Electrical Power System (EPS). 
TEAMS is a model-based system; the model captures a 
system’s structure, interconnections, tests, procedures, and 
failures, which is the relationship between various system 
failure modes and system instrumentation. More precisely, a 
pass-fail test (performed on the data from instruments) 
provides evidence of the possible failure of one or more 
systems ‘upstream’ of the test.  TEAMS determines the root 
cause (failed components and their failure modes, the “bad” 
components in the TEAMS vernacular) using multiple test 
results. When the test results cannot uniquely identify a 
single failed component, TEAMS provides a list of possibly 
failed components (the “suspect” set).  Customized 
schematic displays of the EPS system rendered the good, 
bad and suspect output of TEAMS for use by the flight 
controllers and crew during the AMO experiment; the UI is 
shown in Figure 2.  TEAMS was part of the Ares 1-X launch 
vehicle Ground Diagnosis Prototype [17] and the TacSAT3 
satellite Vehicle System Management (TVSM) experiment 
[13]. 
 
Third, the procedures for operating spacecraft systems and 
performing tasks were presented using an electronic 
interface called WebPD, shown in Figure 8.  WebPD 
incorporated a focus bar, allowing the crew to track their 
place in a procedure.  The crew could issue commands to 
spacecraft systems from WebPD.  Procedure steps often 
required reading system data values or checking limits; 
WebPD ‘listens’ to all system data, and these are 
incorporated in the WebPD interface. ACAWS could send 
messages to the WebPD, prompting the crew to perform a 
procedure. WebPD could be configured to automatically 
issue instructions, or act as an automatic scripting engine.   
 
WebPD procedures are stored in Procedure Representation 
Language (PRL), a derivative of XML [11], and developed 
in a graphical environment called the Procedure Integrated 
Development Environment [6].  PRL has been developed 
over many years by NASA.  PRL and a predecessor of 
WebPD have been used in previous simulations of mission 
operations environments [5, 12].   
 
Finally, WebPD status was shared over the air-ground link, 
so that the flight control team could see what procedures 
were executing, and what procedure step the crewperson 
running a procedure was presently executing. 
 
It is apparent that each of the elements of the mitigation 
configuration are complementary. However, only in the 
cases of ACAWS and the WebPD was there tight integration 
between technologies in the mitigation (i.e. ACAWS 
notification of procedures to run, which are then shown to 
the crew in WebPD) . 
 
The specific Mitigation configuration components are 
summarized in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5. Summary of Baseline and Mitigation 
Configurations 
 
Descriptions of Runs 
For each time delay (50 and 300 seconds), five scenarios 
were conducted: one Nominal, two Systems, and two 
Medical.  This group of scenarios was repeated for both the 
Baseline and Mitigation configurations.     
Crews were assigned scenarios in such a way that: 
• Each crew experienced at least one Nominal, one 
Systems, and one Medical scenario.  
• Each crew experienced both 50 and 300 second 
time delays. 
• Each crew experienced the same combination of 
time delay and scenario in both the Baseline and 
Mitigation configurations. 
4. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE  
Several types of data were collected for analysis.  Since the 
main purpose of the study was to assess how flight 
controllers and crew were impacted by the time delays and 
configuration (Baseline or Mitigation), the AMO team 
created surveys consisting of subjective ratings and 
comments to evaluate performance.  Data on the number of 
activities completed and procedure execution logs were 
collected to provide quantitative analysis.  Voice and texting 
communications were logged in order to provide quantitative 
analysis of the ways that the team coordinated under the 
various test conditions. These data collection methods are 
described further below.    
 
Objective Measurements 
Two objective measurements provided insight into the 
impact of time delay, and differences in configuration.  The 
first of these measurements is task completion.  As tasks 
were started and completed, the crew would notify the KALI 
flight controller, who in turn recorded this information.  As a 
result, start time, end time, and activity completion for every 
experiment were recorded for later analysis. 
 
The second of these measurements is communications 
between the flight controllers and crew.  In both the Baseline 
and Mitigation configurations, each voice call start time and 
end time was recorded.  In the Mitigation configuration,  
 
 Baseline Mitigation 
Communications Voice Voice + Texting 
Fault Management Limit 
Checking 
Advanced Caution and 
Warning 
Procedures PDF Electronic Procedures 
Situational 
Awareness 
Voice Voice + Shared Electronic 
Procedures 
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each text message was logged and archived.  This permitted 
quantitative analysis of how team communication varied.  
Figure 9.  The Bedford workload rating questionnaire. 
 
Subjective Measurements 
Immediately following each run, each participant completed 
an electronic questionnaire. The first order of business on 
the questionnaire was to select a workload rating for the just-
completed run on a slightly modified version of the Bedford 
workload rating scale. Shown in Figure 9, the Bedford asks 
participants to rate their workload on a scale from 1 to 10, 
with values from 1 to 3 associated with the lowest “green” 
category (workload satisfactory without reduction), values 
from 4 to 6 associated with the intermediate “yellow” 
category (workload unsatisfactory without reduction), and 
values from 7-9 associated with the highest “red” category 
(workload intolerable for your tasks).  Bedford was chosen 
because Bedford is an “anchored” scale; each point on the 
scale is associated with a clearly specified selection 
criterion, based on assessments by operators of how much 
spare attentional capacity they thought they would have had 
to perform additional tasks, should any have been imposed. 
This stands in contrast to unanchored scales, like NASA’s 
TLX, that leave the criteria for selecting one value over 
another much more arbitrary [15,16].  From an operational 
evaluation perspective, the demarcation of workload into a 
three-colored color scheme  allows  analysts to determine 
whether an overall operational environment produced a 
satisfactory (Green zone) versus unsatisfactory 
(Yellow/Red) level of workload for its operators, and is 
therefore in need of additional tool development, tool 
improvement, or other alteration to further reduce workload, 
or the current ops environment yielded a satisfactory 
workload level (green area), rendering further modifications 
to the ops environment unnecessary.     
 
The workload rating was followed by 10 questions that were 
each answered by selecting one value from a five-point 
rating scale.  Several questions targeted crew-ground 
coordination issues (e.g., “In the run you just completed, 
how difficult was it to coordinate activities with 
crew/ground”  (1 = very easy to coordinate, 3 = moderately 
difficult to coordinate, 5  = very difficult to coordinate, 6 = 
Not Applicable)”.  Other questions asked for an explicit 
rating of the  impact of time delay on a specific operation 
(e.g., “assuming the run you just completed included a 
systems malfunction, please rate the impact of the time delay 
on your ability to work the malfunction (1 = no impact, 3 = 
moderate impact, 5 = strong impact, 6 = run contained no 
systems malfunction or I was not involved in working the 
malfunction). 
 
In addition to these subjective metrics, comments from the 
observers were solicited after each rating to provide better 
understanding of their ratings choice, and to acquire further 
insight into their view of what happened on the run and why. 
For example, Question 7.1 was worded as follows: 
“Assuming the run you just completed contained a systems 
malfunction, please rate the impact of the time delay on your 
ability to work the malfunction (1 = no impact, 3 = moderate 
impact, 5 = strong impact; 6 = the run contained no systems 
malfunction or I was not involved in working the 
malfunction). The following question then asked for written 
comments to clarify respondents’ choice: “If you responded 
to question 7.1 with a numerical rating (i.e., the run 
contained a systems malfunction and you had some 
involvement in it), please explain your choice.  If you rated 
the impact of time delay on malfunction handling as minor, 
(1 or 2), was that because the time delay was small, or the 
software tools (i.e., ACAWS) and communications protocols 
provided effective mitigation, or coordination with crew 
wasn’t necessary or important? If you rated the impact as 
moderate or strong, (3 or more), how did the impact 
manifest itself? In greater difficulty coordinating activities 
with crew? In disruptions of voice loops with crew? In 
maintaining a shared “mental model” of the situation with 
crew? In all (or none) of the above?”  
 
At the completion of each participants’ final run, after 
completing the “after-run” survey, they proceeded to 
complete a second “wrapup” questionnaire. The “wrapup” 
survey included a series of questions designed to elicit 
usability opinions and evaluations of the software tools 
provided during Baseline (the PDF-based procedure displays 
and limit-based C&W tools). For each tool, opinions were 
solicited by asking participants to note three things that they 
liked about the tool and three things that they disliked about 
the tool, followed by a more open-ended opportunity to 
make any additional comments and recommendations for 
feature improvements. These questions were repeated in the 
“wrapup” questionnaire administered at the completion of all 
Mitigation runs, but with evaluations of the tools available 
during Mitigation (e.g., WebPD, ACAWS, and texting).  
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5. TASK COMPLETION ANALYSIS 
On the assumption that our tasks entailed a reasonable level 
crew-ground interaction, one of our most straightforward  
hypotheses was that time delay would lower the proportion 
of timeline activities crews were able to complete. 
Figure 10.  Timeline task completion, averaged across 
the 5 runs at 50 and 300 seconds. 
 
Figure 10 shows the average number of activities completed 
over all individual runs at 50 seconds and 300 seconds of 
time delay.  Recall that there are 5 scenarios at each time 
delay; one Nominal, two Systems, and two Medical, and that 
the same crew, time delay, and the combinations of crew and 
scenario selected for Baseline were repeated in Mitigation. 
There did appear to be a reduction in the number of activities 
completed as the time delay increased from 50 seconds to 
300 seconds; on average, one fewer task is completed at the 
higher time delay. This reduction is quite modest, however, 
and there appeared to be no difference in activity completion 
rates as a result of configuration.  Furthermore, recall that 
the Baseline configuration timeline included two activities 
(schedule-prepwork and Daily Planning Conference) as 
compared to a single activity (schedule-prepwork) at the 
beginning of the timeline.  Since these activities were always 
completed, regardless of run, it may be fairer to say that 
more activities were completed in the Mitigation 
configuration than the Baseline configuration.  Since the 
unified schedule-prepwork activity consisted of a single 25 
minute block of time, the extra time could have been used to 
complete the task.   
 
Despite these nuances, the tentative conclusion is that, rather 
surprisingly, activity completion rates were not impacted to 
any meaningful extent by either time delay or configuration. 
 
6. TIME DELAY AND WORKLOAD  
Crew Workload.  
Figure 11 shows the average workload ratings of 
crewmembers as a function of time delay and operational 
configuration (error bars indicate the standard deviation of 
the distribution of ratings scores obtained in each condition). 
Recall that a Bedford workload rating of three or below falls 
within the “green zone” (workload satisfactory without 
reduction), whereas ratings of four to six fall in the “yellow 
zone” (workload unsatisfactory without reduction). As 
shown by the error bars, most ratings fell in a range between 
two and six, with three of the four averages straddling the 
border between “Green” and “Yellow”.  
Figure 11.  Crew workload, averaged across the 5 runs at 
50 and 300 seconds. 
 
The figure also reveals that in Baseline, the average rating 
fell just above the “Satisfactory without Reduction” (3.25) 
range at the 50 second time delay and increased to the 
“Unsatisfactory without Reduction” range (4.1) at 300 
seconds. In Mitigation, on the other hand, the average rating 
decreased between 50 and 300 seconds, almost reaching the 
desirable “Green” zone at 300. This is an interesting pattern 
that we had not expected. A three-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with crew, time delay (50 versus 300 sec) and 
operational configuration (Baseline versus Mitigation) as 
factors revealed no main effect or interaction involving 
crew, no main effect of configuration or time delay, but a 
significant interaction between configuration and time delay, 
F(1,12) = 10.36, p < 0.01. Individual comparisons revealed 
that the difference in workload between 50 and 300 seconds 
was significant in the Baseline configuration (p < .05) but 
not the Mitigation configuration. 
 
FCT Workload.  
Overall, workload ratings were considerably lower among 
FCT members than crewmembers. This is probably because, 
as we noted earlier, the FCT had more of a supporting role in 
flight operations than the crews. Indeed, a rank ordering of 
average workload ratings in the Baseline configuration by 
FCT position revealed that the ratings for fully four of the 
eight flight controllers console positions fell in the low 
(Green) zone. This is largely due to lack of involvement of 
these operators in most tasks on the timeline.  In an attempt 
to eliminate these floor effects and increase the sensitivity of 
statistical testing, only the data for the four highest workload 
positions (FLIGHT, CAPCOM, KALI and CERES) were 
subjected to statistical analyses.  The average workload 
ratings of just these highest-workload console positions are 
plotted in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12.  Highest four flight controllers’ workload 
averaged across the 5 runs at 50 and 300 seconds. 
 
In a clear departure from the pattern exhibited by 
crewmembers, Figure 12 reveals that flight controller 
workload  ratings were consistently higher in Baseline than 
in the Mitigation, and higher under 300 seconds of time 
delay than under 50 seconds of delay for both 
configurations. An ANOVA with crew, time delay, and 
configuration as factors revealed marginally significant 
effects of both configuration [F(1,12) = 3.99, p < .07], and 
time delay [F(1, 12) = 4.12, p < .07], and no hint of an 
interaction. 
 
7. TEAM COORDINATION  
What factors contributed to the increase in workload for both 
crew and FCT between 50 and 300 sec in the Baseline 
Condition, and why did crew workload either stay flat or 
decrease slightly across time delay in the Mitigation 
condition, but increase for FCT members? Determination of 
workload ratings was completed “open ended”; to avoid any 
bias toward our experimental manipulations, participants 
were not supplied with any guidance concerning what 
features of the operational environment they should consider 
when determining their ratings. Thus, it was interesting to 
note that in their explanation for why they selected the rating 
they did in the Baseline configuration, several crewmembers 
identified ground coordination issues as a contributing 
factor; similarly, coordination issues with crew (in the case 
of FCT members) was a common theme in the comments of 
FCT members. For example, one crew member noted: 
“Time delay made it difficult to do voice comm and still keep 
your place in procedures since the time is long enough the 
crew moves onto other tasks while waiting for the [Mission 
Control Center] MCC to get back in touch for further 
direction.” 
 
This quote was one of several that pointed out that time 
delay increased the multitasking demand on crews, as they 
started new tasks before existing tasks were completed while 
awaiting feedback from ground on tasks not yet completed. 
Multi-tasking imposes a number of demands on memory and  
 
activity coordination that might be expected to increase 
workload.   
 
Figure 13.  Crew rating of coordination difficulty, 
averaged across the 5 runs at 50 and 300 seconds. 
 
Another crewmember noted: “No satisfying feedback that 
any transmission if [sic] info (voice, files, crew notes) was 
being received or buffered at the ground in a timely enough 
manner that it didn't exceed the length of my short term 
memory. So I had to write info down in case I got a "say 
again" or "file not received" message back from MCC 
minutes after I'd dumped the details from my buffer.” 
 
The second quote indicates that the long time delay 
condition forced the crew to incorporate additional 
coordination-related activities that weren’t necessary when 
time delay was short – another obvious candidate for 
increasing workload.  In general, then, the evidence from 
these  (and many other) comments suggests that 
crew/ground coordination issues were a significant 
contributor to the increase in workload experienced by crew 
(and possibly ground) in Baseline when time delay increased 
from 50 seconds to 300 seconds.  
 
If this hypothesis is true, coordination difficulty itself would 
be expected to be increase along with time delay. As part of 
the questionnaire that immediately following each run, both 
crew and flight controllers were asked the following 
question: 
 
 “In the run you just completed, how difficult was it to 
coordinate activities with the ground”? (1 = not at all 
difficult to coordinate, 3 = moderately difficult to 
coordinate, 5 = quite difficult to coordinate).” 
 
If coordination difficulty contributed to higher workload at 
the longer time delays,  we would expect to see coordination 
rated as more difficult in the 300 sec condition compared to 
the 50 sec condition. Figure 13 shows the average and 
standard deviation of the crew’s ranking of the difficulty of 
coordination with the flight control team; Figure 14 shows 
the equivalent rankings for the FCT. As before, the flight  
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controller Figure includes ratings from of the high workload 
flight control positions only. 
Figure 14.  Highest four flight controllers’ coordination 
difficulty, averaged across the 5 runs at 50 and 300 
seconds. 
 
The Figures show that ratings of coordination difficulty did 
indeed increase with time delay, both for the crews and 
flight controllers.  The Figures also reveal that coordination 
was ranked as easier in the Mitigation configuration than in 
the Baseline configuration. These observations were 
supported by statistical analyses. In an ANOVA on crew 
ratings including crew, configuration, and time delay as 
factors, the main effects of configuration [F(1,12) = 9.55, p 
< .01] and time delay [F(1,12), 7.57, p<.01] were significant. 
For FCT members, the corresponding tests for configuration 
[F(1,12) = 14.5, p<.01] and time delay [F(1,12) = 5.31, 
p<.05] were also significant.    
 
Still further evidence of a link between workload ratings and 
coordination difficulty can be found in the fact that in 
Baseline, the product-moment correlations between 
workload ratings and ratings of coordination difficulty were 
considerable, .43 for the crew and .51 for ground. In 
Mitigation, the correlation was unchanged for FCT at .51 but 
dropped to .29 for Crew.  This pattern would be expected if 
crews operated more autonomously in Mitigation, rendering 
coordination difficulty less influential. 
 
While coordination difficulties are implicated in the increase 
in workload experienced between 50 and 300 sec of time 
delay, it is also clear from the data that workload was 
reduced in the Mitigation configuration for flight controllers 
and for crew, most notably for the crew at the 300 sec time 
delay. In the following sections, we delve into participants’ 
comments about the usefulness, impact, benefits, and issues 
associated with the advanced support tools provided during 
Mitigation. In particular, we focus on comments that gave 
clues to what aspects of the Mitigation configuration may 
have been associated with reducing workload as well as 
several related issues, such as why crew workload either 
remain flat or possibly decreased slightly with time delay in  
 
Mitigation, while flight controller workload increased by 
roughly the same amount as in Baseline. 
 
Texting 
Crewmember comments about texting indicate that the 
ability to communicate via texting greatly reduced 
crew/ground coordination difficulty (and possibly 
workload): 
 
“Time delay made it difficult to do voice comm and still keep 
your place in procedures since the time is long enough the 
crew moves onto other tasks while waiting for the MCC to 
get back in touch for further direction. Texting was more 
effective than voice since we could go back and refer to the 
various recommendations from the ground.” 
 
“Ground or crew could go back and read IM [instant 
message] transmissions if they forgot or needed to reference 
for any reason.” 
 
According to these comments, texting reduced coordination 
difficulty because it freed crew from having to monitor the 
voice channels. Unlike Baseline, crew did not need to write 
anything down; they could concentrate on their work of the 
moment and refer to the texting log later, if need be. 
 
Flight Controllers had many similar comments about texting 
(and WebPD, which will be discussed in the next section): 
 
“Workload for [Control Center] CC was much lower by 
adding texting capability. My job switched from a listening 
mode to scanning/monitoring mode – watching the crew-
progress in WebPD and watching for new texting 
messages.” 
 
In summary, the comments about the texting tool suggests 
that the reduction in crew workload at the longer delays in 
the Mitigation configuration was partly due to a reduced 
need for monitoring and communicating via voice loops, 
which freed up mental capacity to more effectively manage 
multitasking situations. However, FCT members provided 
additional comments indicating that the texting tool also 
increased workload: 
 
“Workload was higher because with Text I had to monitor 
what conversations were on text and which ones were on 
audio.” 
 
“Two separate Text windows plus voice loops made more 
things to monitor.” 
 
We will have more to say about these “countervailing” 
comments in the following section on WebPD.  
 
WebPD 
WebPD was also enthusiastically received by crew and 
ground, and WebPD comments also shed important 
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additional light on the workload and coordination results. 
The following are two highly representative comments about 
the benefits of WebPD from FCT members: 
 
“WebPD made it very easy to follow along in the procedures 
even with the time delay” 
 
“Very easy to see where the crew should go from the line 
they were on as well as where they were going”. 
  
“The ability to track procedures and where the crew was in 
each step was awesome”. 
 
Not only did WebPD help the ground keep track of where 
the crew with within a procedure, but several mentions were 
made of the usefulness of the windows that showed what 
procedures were currently active, and which procedures had 
been completed: 
 
“[I liked] [Ability to] see when crew brings up and starts a 
procedure, can see when they are done with a procedure.” 
 
In addition, many FCT members noted that the higher 
situation awareness afforded by WebPD enabled them to cut 
down on communications: 
 
“WebPD helped because I didn’t have to ask them about 
activities”. 
 
Finally, several comments hinted that texting and WebPD 
were complementary when it came to reducing workload: 
 
“Workload for CC was much lower by adding [texting] Chat  
capability. My job switched from a listening mode to 
scanning/monitoring mode – watching the crew-progress in 
WebPD and watching for new chat messages.” 
 
These observations all pointed to a role for WebPD in 
reducing workload. However, just as with the texting tool, 
some comments from FCT members revealed another 
perspective: 
 
“Workload was actually more noticeable because we 
actually had insight into the progress of the procedure from 
WebPD”. 
 
We have noted several times that ground has more of a 
responsibility for monitoring and maintaining high situation 
awareness of Crew activities than the other way around. 
Essentially, as the Mitigation tools increased the amount of 
information available to FCT, flight controllers spent more 
time understanding what the crew was doing by monitoring 
these sources, thus increasing their workload.  This partially 
explains the different workload pattern between crew and 
ground in Mitigation, where the impacts of the tools were 
almost exclusively to reduce workload for the crew, but a 
mix of workload benefits and penalties for the ground.  
ACAWS 
Recall that the ACAWS technology provided two different 
forms of automated assistance with FDIR activities: 
Automated fault diagnosis, and automated recommendation 
of fault isolation or recovery procedures.  Flight controller 
comments again indicate both workload reduction and a 
reduction in the need for coordination followed from these 
capabilities: 
 
“ACAWS provided useful direction for the crew, so there 
was little need for us to do anything other than concur” 
 
Similarly, crew comments were positive, and hinted that the 
tool allowed the crew to proceed more autonomously than in 
Baseline: 
 
“ACAWS told me which procedure to work which the 
ground later confirmed but I had already completed the 
procedure.” 
 
The last quote speaks to both the situation awareness and 
autonomy issues, and also notes the benefits of greater 
autonomy for mitigating the effects of time delay: 
 
“The time delay had little impact because ACAWS ran most 
of the procedure.  Since the ground and crew can follow 
ACAWS, it was pretty seamless.  MCC and DSH were able 
to come to common agreement with ACAWS.  MCC and 
DSH statused each other via voice calls and texting.” 
 
8. COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS 
The following comment is representative of a large number 
of similar comments to the effect that in the Mitigation 
configuration, the texting capability, the heightened situation 
awareness afforded by WebPD, and the more autonomous 
operational concept afforded by ACAWS all contributed to 
reducing the net amount of bi-directional communication 
required between the crew and the ground.  
 
“Having ACAWS and Pidgin [texting] were useful in 
keeping track of crew activities and detailed information 
without having to call down to the crew”. 
 
Table 6.  Voice only communications analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We evaluated this possibility by quantifying the total time 
that flight controllers and crew were engaged in 
communications in Baseline and Mitigation. Table 6 shows 
the total time spent by flight controllers and crew 
communicating over the voice channels. This includes time 
spent by flight controllers communicating with each other as 
well as all ‘air-to-ground’ communications. The times are 
accumulated separately for all runs at 50 seconds and 300 
17 
 
 
 
seconds of time delay.  As shown in Table 6, there is no 
apparent difference in the amount of voice communication 
as a result of the time delay, either in the Baseline or 
Mitigation configurations.  It is also apparent that less voice 
coordination takes place in the Mitigation configuration at 
both time delays; the final column shows the proportional 
reduction (ratio) of voice communication.  
 
Table 7.  Voice and texting communication analysis. 
 
Recall from Table 5 that there are four significant 
differences between the Baseline and Mitigation 
configurations: WebPD, ACAWS, Text, and the sharing of  
status between the crew and the flight control team through 
these tools that was not available in Baseline.  One obvious 
possibility for the reduction in talk time from Baseline to 
Mitigation was simply that texting simply replaced voice as 
a means of communication, but the total volume of 
communication was unchanged.  Table 7 combines Text and 
Voice communications in an attempt to determine whether 
the total volume of communication was reduced, or was just 
split between the two communication channels.  In order to 
do so, the logged texting messages were assumed to be 
uttered at a rate of 2 words per second.  The resulting time 
was added to the times spent using voice in Table 6.  The 
results show that communication was still reduced during 
Mitigation when compared to Baseline configuration.  It is 
also interesting to note how much communication was 
performed with texting instead of voice; roughly 11% of 
communications at 50 seconds time delay were performed 
through texting, versus roughly 13% of communications at 
300 seconds. 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The Autonomous Mission Operations experiment provided a 
unique exploration of the reactions of NASA-trained flight 
controllers and astronauts to time delayed mission operations 
both in today’s operations environment and in a environment 
featuring a suite of advanced automation tools and 
associated user interfaces.  We conducted a series of runs of 
a two hour quiescent mission timeline.  Each run was 
characterized by a time delay, ranging from 50 to 300 
seconds one-way; a scenario, either Nominal, Systems 
failure, or Medical emergency; and a spacecraft and 
operations protocol configuration, either Baseline or 
Mitigation.  Specifically, the Mitigation configuration: 
 
• Included texting as a means of communication in 
addition to Voice. 
• Added ACAWS to improve fault management.  
• Replaced PDF versions of procedures with 
electronic procedures and the WebPD to track 
procedure execution and receive recommendations 
from ACAWS.  
• Provided sharing of WebPD across the air-ground 
link.  
 
Insight into the effects of time delay were gleaned through 
subjective questionnaires, evaluation of the number of 
completed activities, and analysis of voice and (in the case 
of the Mitigation configuration) texting logs.  Our key 
findings are: 
 
• Workload ratings and coordination difficulty 
between the flight control team and the crew increased 
with time delay. 
• Workload and coordination difficulty decreased as 
a result of the mitigation configuration. 
• Communications acts decreased in the Mitigation 
configuration. 
• Flight controller workload ratings responded 
differently to configuration and time delay than the crew 
workload; specifically, crew workload was reduced by 
time delay in the Mitigation configuration, while flight 
controller workload increased with time delay 
regardless of configuration. 
• Text, WebPD, and ACAWS were all explicitly 
identified as contributions to reduction in workload for 
the crew, but acted to both reduce and increase 
workload for the flight controllers. 
• In contrast to these subjective and objective 
measures of performance, the actual number of tasks 
completed showed little effect of either time delay or 
configuration. 
 
To begin to come to grips with all these findings and pull 
them all together, we begin with the results of a survey 
question completed by all participants at the end of the 
study:  
 
“Taking into consideration all the scenarios, tasks, 
procedures, operational protocols, etc. that you experienced 
on this project, how would you rate the fidelity of the 
operations testing environment compared to an actual 
mission? (1 = Very low fidelity, 3 = Medium fidelity, 5 = 
Very high fidelity)” 
 
The average over all participants was 3.1, or exactly in the 
middle of the scale, indicating that the experiment was 
performance in the context of a “medium fidelity” 
simulation. In their explanation for this rating, participants 
pointed over and over again to the fact that the DSH systems 
were not nearly as complex as the systems onboard a real 
spacecraft. Recall that the workload ratings were collected 
on the Bedford workload rating scale, which asked 
participants to choose heir rating against a “spare attentional 
capacity” dimension:  In the run just completed, how much 
spare capacity would you have had to handle more tasks, 
should additional task requirements have been imposed? The 
fact that most ratings fell at or near the boundary between 
the low (Green) and intermediate (Yellow) ranges indicates 
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that we carried out our evaluation of time delay in a context 
where participants virtually always had capacity to spare. 
Two consequences follow from this supposition. First, spare 
capacity was available in even our most difficult workload 
situations. We suggest that participants utilized that spare 
capacity (casually speaking, they simply “tried harder”) to 
ensure that they got their allocation of tasks completed, even 
in Baseline and even in the 300 sec time delay condition. 
This would account for why the empirical measures on task 
completion were barely affected by either configuration 
condition or time delay. Instead, the effects of these 
variables were manifest in terms of subjective workload. The 
second consequence follows directly from this observation 
by one of the participants: 
 
“These sims were useful for testing new tools and comm 
delays with the crew - but not high enough fidelity for real 
procedure and execution tests.  I suspect time delays in 
malfunction scenarios with far more complicated procedures 
would be far more challenging than we experienced in this 
lower fidelity environment.”   
 
The take-home message from this is simple: In a higher-
fidelity simulation, participants would not have had (as 
much) spare capacity to handle the difficulties brought on by 
time delay, and so some of the impact would have been on 
task performance itself. In other words, the results of our 
experiment underestimated the impact of time delay on 
future deep-space mission operations, particularly for the 
most dangerous off-nominal situations during dynamic flight 
phases, when the most safety-critical and complex systems 
are all operational. Indeed, the fact that we did find clear 
impacts of time delay even in our less critical operational 
environment speaks to the ubiquity of time delay effects, and 
reinforces the need for ongoing work to develop, test, and 
validate next-generation operational concepts for next-
generation missions. 
 
Future work should fall into two different categories.  The 
first category is further analysis of the data collected during 
this experiment.  One example of further analysis is the 
assessment of data by scenario type; for instance, is there a 
relationship between the time delay, configuration, and 
scenarios?  Another example is by flight controller position; 
for instance, is there a deeper relationship between 
individual flight controller roles (e.g. CapCom), time delay, 
and configuration?  A third area of work is to analyze the 
voice and text logs to perform a deeper analysis of 
communications; were different words or phrases used with 
different frequency in different configurations?  Were 
different words or phrases used in Text messages than were 
used in voice?    
 
The second category of future work would be to conduct 
different experiments to learn more about the impact of time 
delay on operations.  As noted in the comments about 
experiment fidelity, the spacecraft system and duration of 
runs impacted the fidelity.  An experiment such as the ones 
conducted here should be performed in a higher fidelity 
environment in order to refine the lessons learned.  In 
addition, additional experiments are needed to refine what 
elements of the mitigation configuration are truly 
responsible for influencing crew and flight controller 
workload and coordination difficulty.  For example, it may 
be worthwhile to evaluate each of the four elements of the 
Mitigation configuration independently.  
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